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THE THREE-JUDGE FEDERAL COURT IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION: A PROCEDURAL ANACHRONISM
A federal district court may not grant an injunction restraining the enforce-
ment of a state or federal statute on the ground of unconstitutionality unless the
application for the injunction has been heard and determined by three judges.'
From the decree of the three-judge district court an appeal lies directly to the
Supreme Court.2 This extraordinary procedure was originally designed to pro-
tect certain state and federal legislative programs from hasty invalidation. How-
ever, the procedure has imposed a considerable burden on the courts, and has
been a constant source of difficulty for litigants.
The Supreme Court was recently faced with some of these problems in
128 U.S.C. §§ 2281-82 (1958). Section 2281, which covers injunctions directed against
state laws, provides:
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execu-
tion of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforce-
ment or execution of such statute or of an order madebyan administrative board or commission
acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof
upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is
heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title."
Section 2281 is based on 36 Stat. 557 (1910), as amended, 37 Stat. 1013 (1913); 43 Stat.
938 (1925); 56 Stat. 199 (1942); 63 Stat. 968 (1948). For an account of each amendment see
notes 15 & 26 infra. See generally HuART & WEcHSLER, Tan FEDERAL CouRTs AND ran FED-
my. SYSTEm 848-55 (1953); ROBERTSON & KIRxAM, JUIusDrcToN OF THE SUrPREME CouRT
OF T UNITED STATES 344-67 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951); Bereuffy, The Three Judge
Federal Court, 15 RocKY IT. L. Rnv. 64 (1942); Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47
HARv. L. REv. 795 (1934); Bowen, When Are Three Federal Judges Required?, 16 MINN. L.
REv. 1 (1931); Reference, The Three Judge Federal Court, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 811 (1956).
Section 2282 represents the extension of the three-judge procedure in 1937 to suits for "an
interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of
any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of the United States ...." 50 Stat.
752 (1937), as amended, 62 Stat. 968 (1948). This section differs from section 2281 in that it
does not cover injunctions against orders made by administrative boards or commissions. See
Jameson & Co. v. Mlorgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939). See generally ROBERTSON & KIRK-
HAm, op. cit. supra at 368-375; Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at
October Terms 1935 and 1936, 51 HAgv. L. REv. 577, 610-619 (1937); Note, 51 HARv. L.
REv. 148 (1937); Note, 48 YALE L. J. 125 (1938).
28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1958) governs the composition and procedure of the three-judge court.
It provides, inter alia:
"In any action or proceeding required... to be heard and determined by a district court of
three judges... (1) The district judge to whom the application for injunction... is presented
... shall notify the Chief Judge of the Circuit, who shall designate two other judges, at least
one of whom shall be a circuit judge.. .."
This section is further discussed in note 26 infra.
There are a few other types of cases which require a three-judge court from which an appeal
lies to the Supreme Court. The most important of these are suits for an injunction restraining
the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1958),
and certain antitrust cases which are certified by the attorney general, 63 Stat. 107 (1949),
15 U.S.C. § 28 (1958), amending 32 Stat. 823 (1903). See generally ROBERTSON & KnuEAm,
op. cit. supra at 302-12. These acts will not be discussed in this comment.
228 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958): "[Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order
granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in
any civil action... required.., to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges." Direct appeal has always been provided from three-judge decrees.
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Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen.3 A suit had been brought by a
group of Florida avocado growers to enjoin the enforcement of a California
statute which prohibits the importation into California of avocados containing
less than a certain percentage of oil. The growers attacked the statute on two
grounds: first, that it violates the commerce and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, and second, that it is in conflict with the Federal Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. The latter contention does not involve a
constitutional question. Under the terms of the Three-Judge Act, therefore,
three judges would be needed in order to grant an injunction on the first
ground, while one judge alone could grant relief on the second ground. A three-
judge court was convened to hear the entire case, and the court dismissed the
complaint.4
On direct appeal the Supreme Court addressed itself primarily to the pro-
priety of the convening of the three-judge court. A majority of the Court held
that the convening had been proper. The majority reasoned that the Three-
Judge Act shows a congressional intent that the special court should be formed to
decide all claims advanced in attacking a statute so long as at least one such
claim asserts the unconstitutionality of the statute. In short, the court must be
convened whenever an injunction may be granted on the ground of unconstitu-
tionality. To hold otherwise, the Court stated, "would be to permit one federal
district judge to enjoin enforcement of a state statute on the ground of unconsti-
tutionality whenever a non-constitutional ground of attack was also alleged, and
this might well defeat the purpose" of the Three-Judge Act.5
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented, contending that the three-judge court
should be formed only when a claim of unconstitutionality is the sole ground of
attack on a statute. In all other cases he would permit the single judge to grant
relief on either a constitutional or a non-constitutional ground. justice Frank-
furter recognized that to allow the single judge to grant an injunction on a con-
stitutional ground is contrary to the language of the Three-Judge Act. However,
he saw the real problem as being a "choice between holding this three judge pro-
cedure applicable to a large class of non-constitutional cases, where the unusual
demands which that procedure makes upon the federal judiciary were never
thought to be justifiable by Congress, and departing from the strictly literal
3 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
4 169 F. Supp. 774 (1958).
5 362 U.S. at 80. The Supreme Court has in several previous cases upheld the convening of
a three-judge court where constitutional and non-constitutional claims were joined, but the
problem has never been treated at such length as in the instant case. See Railroad Comm'n. v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 391 (1938); Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma
Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386, 390 (1934); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393-94 (1932);
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1913). See also Kurland, The Romero
Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 73 HA'v. L. REv. 817, 838-45 (1960). Where
an injunction has once been granted on the non-constitutional ground, however, the Supreme
Court has held the three-judge procedure and the direct appeal provision inapplicable. Ex
parte Hobbs, 280 U.S. 168 (1929).
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sense of [the act] in order to restrict the scope of this three judge procedure with
a view to preventing its operation outside of its proper, constitutional, sphere."6
It may be asked whether the three-judge procedure is ever justified. The
problem of the Avocado case is only one of a great many which surround the
three-judge system. Others occur more frequently and with far more serious
impositions on the courts and on litigants. These problems will be discussed sub-
sequently in this comment. It is proposed first to examine the causes which gave
rise to the three-judge procedure and then to inquire whether retention of that
procedure is justified today.
I
Both of the Three-judge Acts in question-that applying to state laws and
that applying to acts of Congress-were passed in response to specific problems.
The act requiring three judges in order to enjoin the enforcement of an unconsti-
tutional state law7 resulted from a controversy in 1908 over the power of the
states to regulate transportation and industry. The controversy was set off by
the Supreme Court's holding, in Ex parte Young, 8 that a state's immunity from
suit under the eleventh amendment does not extend to suits brought against
state officers to restrain them from enforcing unconstitutional laws.9 .x parte
Young encouraged railroads and utilities to attack rate-fixing and tax laws, and
the result was a deluge of injunctions issued by federal judges suspending such
legislation."0 The states were bitterly resentful at having their regulatory policies
6 362 U.S. at 91. Compare Justice Frankfurter's earlier characterization of the Three-Judge
Act "not as a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but as an
enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such." Phillips v. United
States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941). See note 66 infra.
7 See note 1 supra.
8 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
9 "Ex parle Young vigorously applied to cases in which rights were asserted under the Four-
teenth Amendment the doctrine of Osborn v. Bank [22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)]: suits to
restrain wrongful acts of state officers acting under, or under color of authority from the state
are not suits against the state, and where the plaintiffs assert rights protected by the Federal
Constitution and laws the federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain them." Hutcheson,
supra note 1, at 799.
Ex parts Young was an original application for habeas corpus brought for the release of the
Attorney General of Minnesota, who had been committed for contempt when he had attempted
to enforce a state statute which a federal district judge had declared to be unconstitutional.
The writ was denied. The state statute in question was an act fixing the maximum rates charge-
able by railroads in intrastate travel in Minnesota. See also Raymond v. Chicago Union
Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
10 See, e.g., Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908) (Virginia order fixing
railway passenger rates); Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1 (1909) (Tennessee act
fixing water rates); R.R. Comm'n. of Louisiana v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 212 U.S. 414
(1909) (Louisiana act fixing telephone rates); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216
U.S. 165 (1910) (Arkansas license fee for foreign corporations).
"[The Three-Judge Act] was enacted to remedy a well-known evil, viz. the activities of
sovereign states too frequently enjoined by a single judge too prone to sign on the dotted line
upon the request of public utilities." Northern P. Ry. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs., 34 F.2d 295,
297 (D. Mont. 1929).
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so often doomed at the will of a single federal judge. The tension was further
increased because of the procedures which then prevailed in the federal courts
for the issuing of injunctions. Temporary restraining orders were often issued ex
parte, and interlocutory injunctions could be issued on affidavits alone."2There
was no statutory limitation on a judge's discretion to continue a temporary re-
straining order or an interlocutory injunction, and often such orders were con-
tinued indefinitely. 3 Federal-state relations were at a crisis.
To cure the situation, it was proposed in Congress that the federal courts be
deprived of jurisdiction altogether over suits challenging state laws.14 The pro-
posal which received the most serious debate, however, was the bill for a Three-
Judge Act, which was finally passed in 1910.1 The act provided-as it does now
-for the enlarged trial court and for a direct appeal by either party to the
Supreme Court. The only power explicitly left to the single judge was the power
to issue a temporary restraining order upon a showing of irreparable damage.
But the impending hearing before the three-judge court was to be given preced-
ence over all other cases on the calendar.
It was not long before the needs which had given rise to the act began to dis-
appear. Only two years after its enactment the Federal Equity Rules were re-
vised, extending to all injunction cases much the same protective procedure
1 The congressional debates on the proposed Three-Judge Act reflected this feeling. See
42 CONG. Rtc. 4846-59 (1908); 45 id. 7253-57 (1910). A typical statement of Senator Overman
of North Carolina was this: "Whenever one judge stands up in a State and enjoins the Governor
and the Attorney General, the people resent it, and public sentiment is stirred, as it was in my
State, when there was almost a rebellion, whereas if three judges declare that a state statute is
unconstitutional the people would rest easy under it.... The whole purpose of the proposed
statute is for peace and good order among the people of the States." 45 CONG. REc. at 7256.
Of the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Young, Senator Bacon of Georgia stated: "[Tlhe
decision trampled on the rights of the State of Minnesota, and I may add that if it trampled on
the rights of the State of Minnesota, it necessarily trampled upon the rights of every other
State.... If these subordinate courts can exercise such power, then, indeed, the States are
but provinces and dependencies." 42 id. at 4853. On Senator Bacon's motion, the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, which covers thirty-six pages of the United States Reports, was
inserted in its entirety into the Congressional Record. 42 id. at 4853-58.
1 See Hutcheson, supra, note 1, at 801. Cf. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 162 Fed-
954, 960 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
13 See the statement of Senator Crawford of South Dakota in 45 CoxG. REc. 7256 (1910).
The judge's discretion as to continuing such preliminary orders was restrained only by general
equitable principles. The controlling statutes were 17 Stat. 197 (1872), and Equity R. 55, 17
Pet. (Unofficial) lxx (1843). See Hutcheson, supra note 1, at 800-01.
14 42 CONG. REc. 4847 (1908). A proposal also was submitted providing that the district
courts be deprived only of the power to issue temporary restraining orders and interlocutory
injunctions against the enforcement of state laws. Ibid.
Is See 42 CONG. REc. 4846-59 (1908); 45 id. 7253-57 (1910). The act originally applied only
to the granting of interlocutory injunctions restraining the enforcement of statutes. However,
in order to broaden the scope of the act, and in order to avoid the anomaly of having one judge
review the order of three judges at the final hearing, the act was amended in 1913 to apply to
administrative orders as well as to statutes, and in 1925 to apply to final injunctions as well as
to interlocutory injunctions. See note I supra.
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which the Three-Judge Act had introduced for cases before the enlarged court.
Under the new rules, for example, the continuance of a temporary restraining
order for more than ten days was prohibited under any circumstances. 6 Even
more important was a series of later federal statutes aimed at curtailing the
power of federal courts to restrain state action. The two most important of
these, the Johnson Act of 193417 and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937,18 deprive
the district courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of state public utility
rate orders and the collection of state taxes. The most important condition for
the operation of the Johnson Act, and the only condition for the Tax Injunction
Act is that "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy" be available in the state
courts.19 The district couts are thus deprived of jurisdiction in the two areas
in which the need for the three-judge court was most strongly felt.
A change appeared also in the nature of the controversies arising under the
Three-Judge Act. The once burning federal-state controversy soon subsided,
and in an ever increasing number of cases the constitutional question had al-
ready been decided. The courts responded to this development by reinterpreting
the act to allow more power to the single judge. The early decisions indicated
that the single judge had been left without power even to determine whether or
not a case fell under the act. So long as the complaint requested injunctive relief
on the ground of unconstitutionality, the statutory court had to be summoned.20
But in Ex parte Poresk2 1 the Supreme Court, while recognizing that a single
judge could never pass on the merits of a complaint which fell within the terms
of the Three-Judge Act, held that he nevertheless had the power to dismiss such
16 Equity R. 73, 198 Fed. xxix (1912). This rule superseded Rule 55, supra note 13. See
ANNOTATED RULES OF PRACTICE n THE UNirD STATES CouRTs 584-95. (Dewhurst ed. 1914).
1748 Stat. 775 (1934), now 28 U.S.C. § 1342.
Is 50 Stat. 738 (1937), now 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
19 The Johnson Act of 1934 lists three other conditions for its operation: jurisdiction must
be based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance to the Federal Constitution; the order
under attack must not interfere with interstate commerce; and the order must have been made
after reasonable notice and hearing.
V See Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539, 545 (1911): "the statute evi-
dences the purpose of Congress that the application for the ... injunction should be heard
before the enlarged court, whether the claim of unconstitutionality be or be not meritorious.
.. " See also Ex parle Northern P.R.R., 280 U.S. 142 (1929); Stratton v. St. Louis S.W.R.R.,
282 U.S. 10 (1930); Ex Parle Madden Bros., 283 U.S. 794 (1931) (mem.); Bowen, supra note 1,
at 23-24, 42. In Ex parle Madden Bros., supra, the single judge had dismissed the complaint
for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the Supreme Court granted mandamus to
compel formation of a three-judge court to rehear the case. The Supreme Court did not make it
clear, however, whether the writ was granted because the single judge was without power to
dismiss by himself for want of jurisdiction or because his decision on the question of jurisdiction
was wrong. The case below is reported, sub. nor. Madden Bros. v. Railroad & Warehouse
Comm'n., 43 F.2d 236 (D. Minn. 1930).
21290 U.S. 30 (1933). This was a suit attacking the Massachusetts compulsory auto insur-
ance law. The district judge had dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no "sub-
stantial federal question," since the Supreme Court had previously upheld that law.
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a case for want of jurisdiction. This distinction proved unworkable in practice. 2
Still further powers had to be given the district judge to dispose of the many
cases which clearly did not merit the imposition on the judiciary of a three-judge
court. Another step was taken in California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding,23
where the Supreme Court stated that the single judge has not only the power
but has also a duty to deny the statutory court whenever he is convinced that the
constitutional question before him is not a "substantial" one.24 Such a finding
usually amounts to an adjudication on the merits.25 Several writers have pro-
tested against this extension of the powers of the single judge,2 but the courts
have unanimously upheld it.27 Indeed, the courts could not much further reduce
the scope of the three-judge requirement without a change in the words of the
act itself.
Another important factor reflecting on the present utility of the three-judge
requirement is the judicially developed practice of the federal courts to abstain
from exercising their jurisdiction when the constitutionality of a state law is at
issue. Abstention is said to be appropriate where it "would serve one of two
important countervailing interests: either the avoidance of a premature and
perhaps unnecessary decision of a serious federal constitutional question or the
avoidance of the hazard of unsettling some delicate balance in the area of fed-
eral-state relationships." 28 This doctrine often governs the outcome of cases
22 The facts of Ex parte Poresky provide a good example of why this was so. In any case
where jurisdiction is claimed on the basis of a "federal question," see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958),
and where the only "federal question" alleged is that which is presented by the plaintiff's
claim that the statute under attack is unconstitutional, a dismissal for want of jurisdiction
really amounts to a decision on the merits of the case.
23 304 U.S. 252 (1938).
24 "It is ... the duty of a district judge... to scrutinize the bill of complaint, to ascertain
whether a substantial federal constitutional question is presented, as otherwise the provision
for the convening of a three judge court is not applicable. ... The lack of substantiality in a
federal question may appear either because it is obviously without merit, or because its un-
soundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the sub-
ject." 304 U.S. at 254-55. For a list of cases in which single district judges have refused to
convene a three-judge court on the authority of the Redling case, see notes 63 and 64, infra.
21 See note 22 supra.
26 Berueffy, supra note 1; Note, 47 Gzo. L.J. 168,172 (1959). See Eastern States Petroleum
Co. v. Rogers, 265 F.2d 593, 595-97 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Note, 62 HARv. L. Rxv. 1398
(1949). It was intended by some of those who supported the passage of the 1942 procedural
amendment to the Three-Judge Acts, now 28 U.S.C. § 2284, that the new section would operate
to deprive the single judge of all power to decide whether three judges are required whenever
the complaint requests an injunction against a statute on the ground of unconstitutionality.
See H.R. REP. No. 1677, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942). The relevant portions of § 2284 read:
"In any action.., required ... to be heard by three judges... (5)... . A single judge shall
not.., hear and determine any application... or dismiss the action, or enter a summary or
final judgment... ." Such an interpretation would seem, however, to be inconsistent with the
language of the section. The opening words of the section indicate that the entire section applies
only to actions in which it has already been determined that three judges are required.
27 See the cases cited in notes 63 and 64 infra.
28 Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 225 (1959) (concurring opinion), quoting Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 32 (1958) (dissenting opinion). See Railroad Comm'n.
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before three-judge courts. During the Supreme Court's last term, two impor-
tant three-judge injunctions were reversed on the ground that the district courts
should have withheld exercise of their jurisdiction.29 The most frequently ad-
vanced rationale for abstention has been the first of those mentioned above-
avoidance of an unnecessary constitutional decision. Thus, abstention is most
commonly exercised in cases in which a constitutional claim is joined in the
alternative with a claim depending only on a construction of the law under at-
tack.30 But in several recent cases the courts have abstained where the sole
ground of attack on a state law was its alleged unconstitutionality.31 The ration-
ale for abstention in such a case can only be the "scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate
the federal courts." 32 The use of the abstention technique is increasing and is com-
ing to replace the three-judge procedure as a protective device in the sensitive
area of federal-state relations.
The second Three-judge Act extended the procedure to suits seeking injunc-
tions against allegedly unconstitutional acts of Congress.33 This act was not
passed until 1937, twenty-seven years after the "state" Three-Judge Act had
gone into effect. There is no indication that any need was felt for such an act
before that time. It was designed to meet a specific problem-this time the
struggle during the depression between the New Deal Congress and the more
conservative judiciary. Most of the New Deal's key programs had been declared
of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168
(1942); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaugh-
lin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949); Shipman v.
DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 (1950); Alabama Public Service Comm'n. v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U.S. 167 (1959). See generally Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism, 24
F.R.D. 481 (1960); Wright, The Abstention DoctrineReconsidered, 37 TExAs L. REv. 815 (1959);
Note, 73 HA~v. L. REv. 1358 (1960); Note, 59 CotLum. L. REv. 749 (1959); Note, 108 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 226 (1959).
An analogous doctrine was set forth by the Supreme Court in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). There the Court held that when the state court procedure for review
of an administrative order is "legislative, not judicial in kind," the federal courts should refuse
to intervene until those procedures have been exhausted. A "legislative" review procedure was
said to be one where the reviewing court has the power to substitute a new order of its own
for that of the administrative agency. Id. at 224-25. Very few state courts have such power,
however, and for that reason the Prentis doctrine has had only minor effect. See Note, 50 HaRv.
L. REv. 813, 815 n.9 (1937).
21 Martin v. Creasy, supra note 28; Harrison v. NAACP, supra note 28. See also Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, supra note 28; Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co.,
360 U.S. 185 (1959); NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
30 E.g., Railroad Comm'n. v. Pullman Co., supra note 28; Harrison v. NAACP, supra
note 28.
3 E.g., Alabama Public Service Comm'n. v. Southern Ry., supra note 28; Atlantic Coast
Line Co. v. City of St. Petersburg, 242 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1957).
n Alabama Public Service Comm'n. v. Southern Ry., supra note 28, at 349.
33 See note 1 supra.
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unconstitutional by single district judges.3 4 The friction between Congress and
the courts grew intense, and strong pressures developed in Congress for control
over the judiciary. 5 One early proposal was that the government simply be
allowed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from injunctions restraining the
enforcement of a "federal law.' 3 6 The proponent of this bill, Senator Black (now
Mr. Justice Black), predicted that the attorney general would exercise the right
of direct appeal only in cases of "vast public moment." 3 7 Other proposals far
more radical were made, 8 however, and the debate in Congress continued for
two years.
The final result of the debate was the Judiciary Act of 1937.39 This act con-
tained three important sections. The~first section provided that the government
may intervene in suits in which the constitutionality of an act of Congress is
"called into question." The second section somewhat resembled Senator Black's
earlier bill. It provided a direct appeal to the Supreme Court for any party to a
suit in which an act of Congress is declared unconstitutional, and to which the
34 See Iujunctions in Cases Involving Acts of Congress, SEN. Docs. Nos. 25-33,37-39,41-44,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). Some of the more well known acts thus suspended were the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Recovery Act of 1933, the Emergency Relief Ap-
propriations Act of 1935, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, and the Tennessee
Valley Authority Act. It was estimated by the Chairman of the TVA that the injunctions re-
straining the operation of the TVA cost the Authority and the consumers a total of $3,802,000.
SEN. Doc. No. 44, supra, at 5-9. See also Frankfurter and Fisher, supra note 1, at 616 n.69,
and 618 n.71.
31 For an indication of the feelings aroused in Congress by the injunctions granted against
the TVA, see 81 CoNG. REc. 235-36, 2142-43 (1937). Compare the extreme statements of the
district judges in Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16, 28 (W. D. Ky. 1934); Duke Power
Co. v. Greenswood County, 10 F. Supp. 854, 855-56 (W.D.S.C. 1935).
363. 2176, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. See 81 CONG. REc. 259-61 (1937).
37 Hearings before tle Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2176, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935).
Of the cases which he had in mind Senator Black said: "I see no reason why we should not
say to the Supreme Court, 'We will send the record up to you.... It is not for you to deter-
mine whether you will take the case or not. Those who are charged primarily with enforcing
the law in this country are bound to be in closer contact with the necessity for a speedy decision
than you are in your court room, and they have determined that this is a case of such great
national moment and importance that it must be decided at once."' Ibid. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes and justices Brandeis and Van Devanter appeared at the hearing and testified in
opposition to Senator Black's bill. Id. passim.
Ei .g., S. 1174, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 81 CONG. REC. 482 (1937) (depriving the district and
circuit courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions against acts of Congress until such acts have
been finally declared invalid by the Supreme Court); H.R. 4279,75th Cong., 1st Sess., 81 CONG.
REc. 820-21 (1937) (prohibiting all federal courts from passing upon the constitutionality of
Acts of Congress); S. 1098, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 81 CONG. Rac. 411 (1937) (prescribing the
number of Justices of the Supreme Court who must concur in holding an act of Congress
unconstitutional). See also H.R. 50; H.R. 2265; and H.R. 3895, all 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
The most spectacular plan was President Roosevelt's proposal to "pack" the Supreme
Court, S. 1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). That bill was adversely reported out by the
Committee on the Judiciary, SEN. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), and failed to
pass in the Senate. See 81 CONG. REc. 7375-81 (1937).
3150 Stat. 732 (1937), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 2282, 2403 (1958). The bill before
passage was H.R. 2260, 75th Cong. 1st Seas. (1937).
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United States is a party. Both of these sections remain in force.40 The third sec-
tion of the Act of 1937 was the three-judge provision; it simply extended the
"state" three-judge procedure, with its right of direct appeal, to cover suits
seeking injunctions against acts of Congress. This section appears to have
been added almost as an afterthought. Sections 1 and 2 of the act were exten-
sively debated in Congress,4' but the three-judge section was not added to the
bill until just before passage, and was never debated on the floor.42 The cases
covered by the three-judge section and by section 2 of the act largely overlap.
Sections I and 2 alone would seem to have effectively met the legislative crisis,
providing as they do for intervention and for direct appeal from judgments
which in fact declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. Indeed, it is difficult to
see how the three-judge provision contributed at all to the purposes for which
the judiciary Act of 1937 was designed.
But the needs which had given rise to the judiciary Act disappeared almost
with its passage. By 1937 the constitutionality of most of the New Deal
program had been settled. Only a year after the judiciary Act was passed the
Supreme Court held that a three-judge court was not needed to pass upon a
complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of the National Recovery Act, since
that act no longer raised a "substantial constitutional question."4 3
II
This history suggests that the three-judge court has become an anachronism.
The needs for which it was designed have largely disappeared, and its remaining
functions have been taken over by other procedures. This alone, however, is not
a convincing argument for abolition of the three-judge system; the system might
still be justifiable as an extra-if not strictly "necessary"-safeguard against
attack on future legislative programs. It is necessary now to look at the results
which the three-judge procedure produces in operation. It will be seen that the
procedure has proven to be an intolerable burden on the courts and a danger-
ous source of procedural pitfalls for litigants.
The most evident effect of the three-judge requirement on the courts is the
disruption which it causes at the trial level, where a second district judge and a
judge of the court of appeals must leave their own benches. Very serious incon-
venience can result in a court which has a crowded docket or which is in an area
40 Section 1 of the act, with minor amendments, is now 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1958); section 2,
with minor amendments, is now 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1958). The latter provides: "Any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of any
court of the United States ... holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action,
suit or proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies.., is a party. .. " See
ROBERTSON & KIRXHAM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 209-18.
41 See 81 CONG. REc. 3254-73, 8507-15, and 8701-02 (1937); SEN. REP. No. 963, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
2 See 81 CONG. REc. 8702 (1937); SEN. REP. No. 963, supra note 41, at 1, 4; H. R. REP.
No. 1490, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
43 California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938).
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where federal judges are few and far between.44 It is not uncommon for a judge
to make a trip of several hundred miles to complete a three-judge court. A
dramatic example of this is provided by a recent case in Guam,45 in which a
plaintiff had requested a three-judge court to pass on the constitutionality of a
federal income-tax law. In denying the plaintiff's request, the single district
judge implied in his opinion that it would be ludicrous to require two extra
judges to travel thousands of miles simply to decide one case. The three-judge
requirement suggests that the sitting judge does not have the ability or the
judgment to decide such a case.46
A far more serious objection to the three-judge procedure lies in its imposition
on the Supreme Court. The Three-judge Acts carve out a large class of cases
over which the Court is not permitted to exercise its traditional right of selective
jurisdiction.47 The history of the acts suggests that the granting of direct appeal
was of doubtful wisdom even when the acts were passed. Now that the con-
troversies which they were designed to meet are a thing of the past, it is difficult
to find any justification at all for Supreme Court review as of right. A look at the
subject matter of the cases now coming to the Supreme Court from three-judge
courts bears this out. There are few, if any, cases of "vast public moment"; nor
is any nationwide legislative policy being frustrated in the district courts. 48
4 This argument was forcefully advanced by the opponents of the original Three-Judge Act
in 1908. 42 CONG. Rxc. 4851 (1908).
S 45Holbrook v. Taitano, 125 F. Supp. 14 (D. C. Guam 1954).
46It has been held that the "state" Three-Judge Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958), does not
apply in territories of the United States. Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368
(1949).
47 The history of this right and its importance to the efficient functioning of the Court are
explored at some length in FRANXPUrTER & LANDis, Tm BusniEss OF THE SP1REME CounT
(1928), particularly at pp. 255-98. See also Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Ex
Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 590 (1943); Hart, Tie Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HtAv. L. Rlv.
84(1959).
48 Beside Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, discussed in the text supra at
notes 3-6, see Hershey 1fg. Co. v. Adamowski, 360 U.S. 717 (1959) (suit by manufacturer of
slot machines attacking a state statute which prohibits slot machines near army posts); NAACP
v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959) (state statute "affecting the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People"); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (state registration
and barratry statutes); Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959) (state statute which authorizes
construction of a limited access highway without providing in terms for compensation of
adjoining property owners who have no direct access); Bibb v. Navaho Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520 (1959) (state statute requiring trucks engaged in interstate commerce to be
equipped with contour mudguards); State Athletic Comm'n. v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959)
(state statute prohibiting prizefights between Negroes and whites); New Jersey v. United States,
359 U.S. 27 (1958) (act of Congress authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to per-
mit abandonment of railroad service without having made a formal investigation); Federal
Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958) (suit to restrain enforce-
ment of a provision of the National Housing Act which prohibits rentals to transients, insofar
as the provision applies to landlords who obtained FHA insurance prior to passage of the
Act); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (state statute requiring Negroes to sit in rear of
busses); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 358 U.S. 101 (1958) (state statute
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Perhaps the most far-reaching three-judge decisions of the past decade have
been those involving school segregation. But even in those cases the three-judge
procedure has not been very effective in expediting decision. The courts have
been in disagreement as to whether the segregation issue raises a sufficiently
"substantial and unsettled" constitutional question to bring it within the Three-
Judge Acts. Consequently, only some segregation cases have been decided by
three-judge courts and appealed directly to the Supreme Court, while many of
their companion cases have been decided by single judges and appealed through
the courts of appeals.49
establishing criteria for placement of school children); Strong v. United States, 356
U.S. 226 (1958); Public Utilities Comm'n. of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958);
Corsa Fish Products Co. v. Tawes, 355 U.S. 37 (1957); Bryan v. Austin, 354 U.S. 933 (1957);
Starr v. Nashville Housing Authority, 354 U.S. 916 (1957); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Corporation
Comm'n. of Oklahoma, 354 U.S. 916 (1957); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Aero Design
and Engineering Co. v. OklahomaEmployment Security Comm'n., 353 U.S. 943 (1957); Schenley
Distillers v. Bingler, 353 U.S. 933 (1957); Government and Civic Employees, CIO v. Windsor,
353 U.S. 364 (1957); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Baumann v. Smrha, 352 U.S. 863
(1956); Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Frasier, 350 U.S. 979 (1956);
Nukk v. Shaughnessy, 350 U.S. 869 (1955); Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1955); Combs v.
Illinois State Highway Comm'n., 349 U.S. 942 (1955); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954); West Virginia Motor Truck Ass'n v. Public Service Comm'n. of West Virginia, 348
U.S. 881 (1954); Webb v. State University of New York, 348 U.S. 867 (1954); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
This list contains all the cases which were found in the Court's last five full terms (1954-
1958) in which the Court passed on appeals from three-judge district courts convened under
§§ 2281 and 2282. There are thirty-one cases in all. Of the thirty-one, sixteen received only a
memorandum opinion (i.e., no more than a statement of the disposition of the case),
while fifteen received fuller treatment. This would seem to indicate that the Court did
not feel most of the cases to be of "vast public moment." It is also interesting to note
that in fifteen of the cases the law under attack was held constitutional, while in only
six was it held unconstitutional. All of these six involved state laws. Ten of the cases were
disposed of on other grounds, such as abstention, lack of a justiciable controversy, etc. Of
the thirty-one cases, the decree of the district court was affirmed in eighteen, reversed in only
six, vacated in five, and the appeal was dismissed in two. Twenty-three of the cases involved
attacks on state laws, while only seven involved acts of Congress.
11 The landmark decisions on school segregation were Brown v. Board of Education and its
companion cases, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)-five cases in
all. Of the five, three were decided by three-judge courts and appealed directly to the Supreme
Court, while one went through the state courts, reaching the Supreme Court via certiorari to
the state Supreme Court, and one was decided by a single federal district judge and appealed to
the court of appeals, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court by certiorari. The latter case,
Bolling v. Sharpe, has a revealing history. The case arose in the District of Columbia. Two
suits had been brought in the district court to enjoin enforcement of the District of Columbia's
school segregation laws, sub nom. Bolling v. Sharpe and Cogdell v. Sharpe. In both cases the
complaint was dismissed by a single district judge. Bolling v. Sharpe was then appealed to the
court of appeals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari before the court of appeals had
rendered judgment. After the dismissal in Cogdellv. Sharpe, however, the plaintiffs pursued
two courses of action simultaneously: first, they appealed the case on the merits to the court of
appeals, and second, they applied in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the
district judge to convene a three-judge court to rehear the case. The Supreme Court continued
the mandamus proceeding to await the decision of the court of appeals on the appeal. Ex parle
Cogdell, 342 U.S. 163 (1951). Nothing is subsequently reported as to either of the two Cogdell
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Alarm has recently been expressed at the insufficiency of time which the
Supreme Court has for the important cases before it. It has been suggested that
this insufficiency seriously hampers the Court in its work."° The three-judge
cases, as part of the Court's obligatory jurisdiction, exacerbate that prob-
lem. The Court has shown on several occasions that it is to be trusted to act
swiftly in cases of real "public moment."'" Moreover, the Court may, in its
discretion, directly review a case which has been appealed to the court of appeals
by granting certiorari to the court of appeals before that court has rendered
judgment. 2 The Supreme Court would seem better qualified than Congress to
judge which cases merit direct review.
Aside from placing a heavy burden on the courts, the three-judge procedure
has been a source of procedural difficulties for litigants. The unusual problems
which may arise when a "three-judge claim" is joined in a single complaint with
a "non-three-judge claim" have been discussed above' 3 Far greater uncertainty
surrounds the procedure for review of a refusal by the district court to convene
a three-judge court. Very often a single district judge denies a request for a
three-judge court.54 Sometimes, too, an already convened three-judge court
finds that the case before it does not really require three judges and sends the
case back to the original single judge." There is no statutory provision for re-
view of such orders," and confusion prevails as to how such review may properly
cases, and the issue was ultimately decided in Bolling. The history of the three proceedings is
recounted in Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Petition for
Mandamus, pp. 2-4, 30, 33, 36, Ex pare Cogdell. See also note 59 infra.
Since the Brown and Bolling decisions there has continued to be considerable difference in
the district courts as to whether a suit attacking racial segregation in the public schools re-
quires a three-judge court. A small majority of the courts have held that three judges are not
required, on the ground that Brown and Boiling have foreclosed the constitutional question.
The Supreme Court has continued to avoid settling the question either way. Compare Coving-
ton v. Montgomery County School Board, 139 F. Supp. 161 (M.D.N.C. 1956) (three-judge
court held that three judges were unnecessary and remitted the case to the single judge) with
Frasier v. Board of Trustees, 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955), a ff'd per uriam, 350 U.S.
979 (1956) (three-judge court rendered a decree and the Supreme Court accepted a direct ap-
peal), and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See Reference, The Three Judge Federal Court,
supra note 1, at 831-32.
" Hart, The Time Chart of the Juslices, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 84 (1959).
1 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959) (steel strike
injunction); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (school segregation). The Supreme Court ex-
pedited decision in both of these cases. In the latter case it had been earlier held by the court
of appeals that a three-judge court was unnecessary because there was not a substantial ques-
tion of constitutionality. Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1958). See note 49 supra.
"2 See Sup. CT. R. 20; 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (e) (1958). Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
53 Pp. 556-57 supra.
'
4 Almost all the cases cited in notes 57-66 infra are of this type.
55E.g., Ex parle Gray, 342 U.S. 517 (1952); Ex pare Public National Bank, 278 U.S. 101
(1928); Shinaberry v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 413 (W. D. Mich. 1956); Davis v. County
School Board, 142 F. Supp. 616 (E. D. Va. 1956); Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 181 (W.D.
Ky. 1955); Frasier v. Board of Trustees, 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. N.C. 1955).
6 The provision for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from decrees of the three-judge
court, supra note 2, has been held inapplicable to orders denying the three-judge court.
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be obtained. A brief analysis of this problem will serve to point out one of the
difficulties inherent in the operation of the three-judge system.
The Supreme Court has indicated in several cases that the exclusive remedy
of a party who has been wrongly denied a three-judge court lies in a writ of man-
damus from the Supreme Court. 7 Despite this rule, some courts of appeals in
recent years have reviewed the order denying a three-judge court on appeal
from the inal decree of the single judge.5 8 Litigants are now in a position where
the only safe course may be to pursue both of these procedures simultaneously.19
An appeal to the court of appeals presents important strategic advantages, but
there is real danger that some courts of appeals will dismiss an appeal because of
the "rule" that mandamus from the Supreme Court is the exclusive remedy. 0
Eastern States Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, 361 U.S. 7 (1959); Safe Harbor Water Power
Corp. v. United States, 313 U.S. 546 (1941); Gross v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 305 U.S.
575 (1938).
57Ex pare Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911); Ex parte Northern P. R.R.,
280 U.S. 142 (1929); Stratton v. St. L.S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930); Ex park Buder, 271 U.S.
461 (1926); Ex part Smith, 274 U.S. 723 (1927); Ex park Williams, 277 U.S. 267 (1928); EX
pare Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928); Ex parte Public National Bank, 278 U.S. 101 (1928); Ex
parle Atlantic Coast Line Co., 279 U.S. 822 (1929); Ex pare Hobbs, 280 U.S. 168 (1929); Ex
pare Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); Ex parle Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940); Ex pare Madden
Bros., 283 U.S. 794 (1931); Ex pare Cogdell, 342 U.S. 163 (1951); Ex parle Gray, 342 U.S. 517
(1952).
58 Carrigan v. Sunland-Tujunga Telephone Co., 263 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1959); Aaron v.
Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1958); White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Jacobs v.
Tawes, 250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957); Wicks v. Southern P. R.R., 231 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.
1956), cert. and motion for leave tofile pelition for nandamus denied, 351 U.S. 946 (1956); Haines
v. Castle, 226 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1014 (1956); Van Buskirk v.
Wilkin.on, 216 F.2d 735 (1954); Board of Supervisors v. Tureaud, 207 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.
1953), and 225 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955); Otten v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
1953); Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Utility Board, 181 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1950); Harvey v.
Early, 160 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1947); Schermerhorn v. Holloman, 74 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1934)"
A petition for mandamus and an appeal are usually available simultaneously, since the
order denying the three-judge court is in most cases accompanied by a dismisal of the complaint.
See note 68 infra.
19 This was the course followed by the petitioners in Eastern States Petroleum Corp. v.
Rogers, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir., May 12, 1960), and in Ex parte Cogdell, 342 U.S. 163 (1951)'
described in note 49 supra. The inconsistency of the arguments which a litigant is forced
to make when he is driven to pursue both the mandamus and appeal remedies at once may be
effectively used against him. Compare Brief for Petitioner, pp. 20-24, Ex parte Cogdell, witlh
Brief for Respondent, pp. 3-4, ibid.
The plaintiff in Wicks v. Southern P.R.R., 231 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1956), after having lost his
appeal to the court of appeals on both the merits and the question of three-judge jurisdiction,
found it necessary to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari and for leave to file a petition
for mandamus in the alternative, having just "uncovered" the line of authorities which indicated
that mandamus was his exclusive remedy when three-judge jurisdiction is at issue. Brief for
Petitioner, p. 5, Wicks v. Brotherhood of Maintenance and Way Employees, 351 U.S. 946
(1956). The Supreme Court denied both in an uninformative memorandum opinion. Ibid.
60 See Waddell v. Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n., 206 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1953)
(court of appeals held that three judges were not required below, but stated that if they had
been the court of appeals would be without power to order a new trial); Chicago D. & G. B.
Transit Co. v. Nims, 252 F.2d 317,319 (6th Cir. 1958) (same); Riss & Co. v. Hoch, 99 F.2d 533
(10th Cir. 1938) (appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction since three judges were required be-
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And a litigant who pursues but one remedy may find that he has made an unfor-
tunate choice and that the alternative is barred by limitations.
Despite the Supreme Court's mandamus rule, several reasons might be given
why an appeal to the court of appeals is the more desirable procedure for review-
ing the order denying the three-judge court. First, the Supreme Court should
not be burdened with cases which can be adequately handled by the courts of
appeals. The question of whether a particular case falls within one of the Three-
Judge Acts is seldom a difficult one. Indeed, the decisions of district judges on
that question are very rarely reversed."1 The reasons commonly given for refus-
ing to convene the three-judge court give an indication of why this is so. The
most frequent reason for denying the court is that the case does not present a
"substantial constitutional question."62 The insubstantiality of the question
might appear either because the plaintiff's claim is without merit on its face,63 or
because his claim is foreclosed by previous decisions.6 4 Other common reasons
for denying the three-judge court are that the district court is in any event
without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint,", and that the law
under attack is not of the type covered by the Three-Judge Acts.66 If the Su-
low); Smith v. Dudley, 89 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1937) (same). It should be noted, however, that a
dismissal may have the effect of an order for new trial, if the court of appeals makes clear its
opinion that three judges are required, and if the district judge is amenable to the suggestion.
See McCormick v. Brown, 52 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1931) (appeal dismissed), and 58 F.2d 994
(S.D. W.Va. 1931) (three-judge trial).
61 The Supreme Court has granted mandamus to compel formation of a three-judge court
in only five cases. Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911); .Ex parle Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 279 U.S. 822 (1929); Ex parle Northern P.R.R., 280 U.S. 142 (1929); Stratton
v. St. L.S.W.R.R., 282 U.S. 10 (1930); Ex parle Madden Bros., 283 U.S. 794 (1931). See
Board of Sup'rs. v. Tureaud, 207 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1953); McCormick v. Brown, 52 F.2d 994
(S.D. W.Va. 1931).
62See California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938), quoted in
part in note 24 supra.
63E.g., Carrigan v. Sunland-Tujunga Telephone Co., 263 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1959); Van
Buskirk v. Wilkinson, 216 F.2d 735 (1954); Harvey v. Early, 160 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1947);
Carras v. Monaghan, 65 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Pa. 1946); Patterson v. Hardin, 145 F. Supp. 299(S.D. Ind. 1956).
64E.g., Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.
1958); Wicks v. Southern P.R.R., 231 F. 2d 591 (7th Cir. 1955); Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
205 F. 2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953) Simonoff v. Murff, 164 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Covington
v. Montgomery County School Board, 139 F. Supp. 161 (M.D.N.C. 1956); O'Rourke v.
Waterfront Comm'n., 118 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
66 E.g., Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Rogers, 265 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Jacobs v.
Tawes, 250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957); Ashley-Cooper Sales Service Co. v. Brentwood Mfg. Co.,
168 F. Supp. 742 (D. Md. 1958). See Priceman v. Dewey, 81 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. N.Y. 1949)
(want of equity jurisdiction; same litigation was pending in state court); Haymes v. Landon,
115 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (want of equity jurisdiction; administrative remedies were
unexhausted).
66E.g., Ex park Williams, 277 U.S. 267 (1928) (tax assessments held not within the con-
templation of the Three-Judge Acts); Ex Parle Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928) (city ordinances
not covered); Schermerhorn v. Holloman, 74 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1934) (tax assessment). See
[V-ol. 27
preme Court's mandamus rule were actually followed by all the courts of ap-
peals, it would have the effect of crowding the Supreme Court docket with a
great many insubstantial claims.
Review by appeal to the court of appeals is also preferable from a strategical
standpoint. If the court of appeals should find that the three-judge court was
not required below, it can go on to review the merits of the decree which was
entered, disposing of the entire case at once. In a mandamus proceeding, on the
other hand, the Court can consider only the question of whether the three-judge
court was in fact required; in either event the parties must be sent back, for
either a new trial or for an appeal on the merits to the court of appeals. The
mandamus remedy does present an advantage in that it allows for interlocutory
review of the order denying the three-judge court, whereas an appeal may not
be taken until either a final decree or a decision on a motion for an interlocutory
injunction has been entered.67 This, of course, can be a decisive consideration
when a long trial is expected. But practically speaking, it has not proved impor-
tant; in most cases the order denying a three-judge court is accompanied by a
dismissal of the complaint.6 8
Still another reason for preferring the remedy by appeal may be found in the
federal courts' rule that an extraordinary writ is improper whenever an ade-
quate remedy may be had by appeal. The mere fact that so many courts of
appeals now satisfactorily dispose of appeals on the point of three-judge juris-
diction offers a strong argument against the propriety of the granting of manda-
mus by the Supreme Court.6 9
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941), in which the Supreme Court held that a three-
judge court had been improperly convened to pass on the constitutionality of a state order to
halt work on a dam project, since the three-judge procedure is intended only for suits threaten-
ing "an improvident statewide doom by a federal court of a state's legislative policy." Id. at
251. Compare cases cited in HAItR & WEcHSLER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 850-51.
67 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958).
68 Only three of the sixteen petitions for mandamus to compel formation of a three-judge
court which are listed in note 57 supra, were filed before the single judge had rendered either a
decision on a motion for an interlocutory injunction or a final decree. The three are Ex parte
Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940); Ex parte Williams, 277 U.S. 822 (1929); Ex parte Public Na-
tional Bank, 278 U.S. 101 (1928).
69 SeeBankersLife andCas.Co. v. Holland,346U.S.379,382-83 (1953),in which theSupreme
Court, refusing a writ of mandamus,stated: "[The] decision againstp etitioner, even if erroneous
... is reviewable upon appeal after final judgment. If we applied the reasoning advanced by
the petitioner, then every interlocutory order which is wrong might be reviewed under the
All Writs Act. The office of a writ of mandamus would be enlarged to actually control the
decision of the trial court rather than used in its traditional function of confining a court to its
prescribed jurisdiction.... The supplementary review power conferred on the courts by Con-
gress in the All Writs Act is meant to be used only in the exceptional case where there is clear
abuse of discretion or 'usurpation of judicial power .... '" See also Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S.
128, 134 (1918); Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932); Ex parte Slater, 246 U.S. 128,
134 (1918). Cf. Sloss, Mandamus in the Supreme Court since the Judiciary Act of 1925, 46
HAsv. L. REv. 91 (1932). SuP. Cr. R. 30 provides: "The issuance by the Court of any writ
authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) [The All Writs Act] is not a matter of right but of sound
discretion sparingly exercised."
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But even if there were a single clear cut remedy for the party who has been
wrongly deprived of three judges-whether the remedy be by mandamus or ap-
peal-what are the consequences of pursuing that remedy? Speed, which is often
of the essence where the enforcement of a law is sought to be restrained, would
not be promoted. Indeed, the disposition of the case would probably be post-
poned if the new trial were ordered, to be followed in turn by a Supreme Court
appeal.70 If more adequate deliberation is an objective of the three-judge system,
the party denied a three-judge court would still not seem to be in a strong posi-
tion to complain. By the time the reviewing court has ordered the new trial, the
case will have been before two courts and several judges-the same as though an
appeal had been taken on the merits alone to the court of appeals. One advantage
which a litigant gains by securing a three-judge trial is that he automatically
becomes entitled to an appeal to the Supreme Court. But this is often won at the
cost of burdening the Supreme Court with an insubstantial claim.
It seems clear that in cases where the three-judge court has once been denied,
the three-judge requirement is often no more than a device by which the party
who lost his case before the single judge can secure a new hearing. If the case
can be shown to fall within the Three-Judge Acts the new trial must be or-
dered, since the single judge's action is void for want of jurisdiction. Yet to order
a new trial would seem to frustrate the purposes of the acts themselves. This
dilemma is inherent in the operation of the three-judge system.
The possibility that the district judge may erroneously deny the three-judge
court is not the only hazard to which the parties are exposed. Just as often the
three-judge court is erroneously convened.7' The decree of an erroneously con-
70 A ludicrous example of such delay is provided by Stratton v. St. Louis S.W.R.R.,282 U.S.
10 (1930). The final dispositionof that case in the Supreme Court was postponed for almost two
years because of the original jurisdictional "fault" in not summoning a three-judge court. The
suit had been brought to restrain the enforcement of a franchise tax imposed by the State of
Illinois on foreign corporations. Neither party requested a three-judge court at any point in the
litigation. The district judge upheld the tax, 27 F.2d 1005 (S.D. Ill. 1928), and the circuit
court reversed, 30 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1929). On certiorari, the Supreme Court found the
jurisdictional fault on its own motion, and held that since the case fell under the Three-Judge
Act, both courts had acted without jurisdiction. A subsequently formed three-judge court
found the tax unconstitutional. The Supreme Court on direct appeal then reversed that decree
on the ground that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law through payment of the tax
under protest and a later action in assumpsit for its recovery. 284 U.S. 530 (1932). Ultimately
the case went to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held the tax unconstitutional. 353 111.273,
187 N.E. 498 (1933).
71 E.g., Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941) (the order sought to be enjoined was
not statewide in its effect; see note 66 supra); Rorick v. Board of Comm'rs., 307 U.S. 208 (1939)
(same); Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (no substantial constitutional
question was presented); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly, 304
U.S. 243 (1938) (the suit was between private parties); Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma
Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386 (1934) (same); Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U.S. 16
(1934) (the suit attacked merely a tax assessment; see note 66 supra); Healy v. Ratta, 289
U.S. 701 (1933) (application for interlocutory injunction was not pressed; see note 15 supra);
Smith v. Wilson, 273 U.S. 388 (1927) (same); Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 272 U.S. 317
(1926) (same).
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vened three-judge court is not void for want of jurisdistion,7 2 as is the decree of
a single judge when three are required. However, the Supreme Court will dis-
miss an appeal from such a court as soon as the defect is discovered. This
necessitates the delay and expense of a second appeal,73 this time to the court of
appeals. But even that may not be possible. By the time the Supreme Court has
dismissed the first appeal, the time for appealing to the court of appeals will
probably have expired.74 This can be remedied only by securing an order from
the Supreme Court directing the district court to enter a new decree from which
a timely appeal can be taken. While in most cases the Supreme Court has been
willing to issue such an order, in some cases it has refused to do so, leaving the
appellant remediless. 75 The only safe course would seem to be to file two appeals,
one to the Supreme Court and one to the court of appeals, whenever there is
doubt as to whether or not a three-judge court has been properly convened.
It is submitted that retention of the three-judge procedure is unjustified.
The needs for which it was designed are largely a thing of the past, and its re-
maining functions have been taken over by other procedures. Far from
furnishing speedy justice in cases of "vast public moment," the three-judge
procedure has proven in operation to be a heavy burden on the courts and a
source of procedural pitfalls for litigants. The Three-judge Acts survive as little
more than an expression by Congress of a lack of confidence in the judiciary.
72 Healy v. Ratta, s=pra note 71.
73 The delay can be considerable. In Healy v. Ratta, supra note 71, for example, two years
were lost between the original three-judge decree granting an injunction and the final decision
in the Supreme Court, which reversed the same decree and dissolved the injunction. In the
meantime, after theSupreme Courthad dismissed a direct appeal on the ground that the three-
judge court had been unnecessarily convened, the court of appeals had taken the appeal on the
merits, 67 F.2d 554 (lst Cir. 1933), and the case had reached the Supreme Court by certiorari.
74 An appeal to the court of appeals must be taken within thirty days from the entry of
judgment in the district court. FED. R. Cxv. P. 73 (a).
7r E.g., Smith v. Wilson, 273 U.S. 388 (1927); Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 272 U.S.
317 (1926). In the Smith case the plaintiff then applied to the Supreme Court for mandamus to
compel the circuit court of appeals to accept his appeal even though it was too late. The
Supreme Court denied the writ. Ex park Smith, 274 U.S. 723 (1927). The case is discussed in
Sloss, supra note 69, at 99.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AND INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
When a defendant in a state criminal prosecution challenges the admission
of his confession, alleging it was coerced,' states following the orthodox proce-
1 The United States Supreme Court first used the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to upset a state conviction based on an involuntary confession in Brown v. Miss's-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). That conviction rested solely upon a confession obtained through
physical violence. In Malinski v. New York, 325 U.S. 401 (1945), the Court held that the ad-
mission into evidence of a coerced confession automatically voids a conviction under the due
process clause, no matter how persuasive the remaining evidence of guilt. This rule of "auto-
matic reversal" was coupled with a progressively broadened concept of what constitutes
involuntariness. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (tender age); Watts v. Indiana, 338
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